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INTRODUCTION: ANTITRUST ON TWO-SIDED
PLATFORMS

In Ohio v. American Express Co. (“Amex”),1 the Supreme
Court had its first explicit opportunity to apply antitrust’s
rule of reason to an allegedly anticompetitive practice on a
two-sided platform. The writ of certiorari petition asked the
Court to consider “how Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
bans unreasonable restraints of trade, applies to ‘two-sided’

* James B. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and the Wharton
School, University of Pennsylvania. Thank you to Dennis Carlton, Harry
First, Irving Scher, and Erik Hovenkamp for comments. A version of this
paper was delivered at the William Howard Taft Lecture, September 14,
2018, to the New York State Bar Association, Antitrust Law Section.
© 2018. Herbert Hovenkamp. All rights reserved.
1 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
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platforms that unite distinct customer groups.”2 The
challenge was to a vertical interbrand restraint, 3 intended to
prevent merchants from steering customers away from
American Express (“Amex”) and toward lower cost credit
cards.4 The suit was originally brought during the Obama
administration by the Antitrust Division and seventeen
states.5 The government won in the district court,6 but the
decision was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.7 The 2016 presidential election
intervened, and the United States, under the new
administration did not seek certiorari, but eleven states who
had been co-plaintiffs did.8 After certiorari was granted,
though, the United States filed a brief on behalf of the
plaintiffs.9
Careful fact-finding is essential to the rational
administration of antitrust under the rule of reason. Under
antitrust’s per se rule, once a practice is shown to fall within
a certain classification, such as naked price fixing, little
additional evidence of anticompetitive effects is relevant and
defenses are limited.10 By contrast, proper application of the

2 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274
(No. 16-1454).
3 A vertical interbrand restraint, such as exclusive dealing, tying, or
most favored nation requirements, consists of limitations on the way that a
dealer can promote or sell a brand other than the one owned by the firm
imposing the restraint. By contrast, an intrabrand restraint, such as resale
price maintenance or a territorial limitation, is a restraint on the disposition
of the imposing firm’s own brand.
4 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2280.
5 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y.
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
6 Id. at 238–39.
7 United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 207 (2d Cir. 2016),
aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
8 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2.
9 Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioners,
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454).
10 See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
1509 (4th ed. 2017).
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rule of reason requires a searching and detailed factual
examination and careful development of a record, enabling the
court to understand the structure and economic effects of the
defendant’s activities.11 This in turn obliges appellate courts
to review the record developed in the district court. The
Supreme Court’s Amex opinion should be tested against this
requirement.
A significant portion of the debate among the various
courts and the Supreme Court majority and dissenters
concerned the way market power and anticompetitive effects
should be measured. Therefore, it is essential to consider what
it means that this dispute took place on a “two-sided”
platform. Although some people speak of two-side markets,
that term creates some confusion when used in juxtaposition
with the term “relevant market” in antitrust. As both the
majority and the dissent made clear, the fact that a platform
is two-sided does not entail that it should be treated as a
single relevant market for antitrust purposes.12 Indeed,
because they lack market power, many platforms are not
relevant markets even if both sides are considered.
Many firms sell complementary products, and often to
different groups of buyers, but that fact alone does not make
them two-sided platforms. Rather, a two-sided platform is a
business that depends on relationships between two different,
noncompeting groups of transaction partners.13 A traditional
example is the printed periodical, such as a newspaper, which
earns revenue by selling both advertising and subscriptions to
the paper itself. Depending on the chosen business model,

11 See id. ¶ 1507 (tracking factual allegations and proof burdens in rule
of reason cases).
12 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2285–86; id. at 2300–01 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
13 The classic treatment of two-sided markets can be found in JeanCharles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,
1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 990 (2003). On definitional problems, see generally
Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust
Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 2142 (2018). Many of the issues were initially
raised in William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper:
Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541 (1983).
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such a periodical might obtain very different mixtures of
advertising and subscriber revenue. At one extreme,
Consumer Reports does not sell advertising but derives its
revenue entirely from subscriptions and donations.14 At the
other extreme, the local neighborhood shopping flier might be
distributed free to customers, with its production and
distribution supported entirely by advertising revenues. The
manager of a two-sided platform maximizes profits by coming
up with the optimal mixture of participation and revenue on
the two sides.
Two-sided platform sellers can be harmed by feedback
effects if they make the wrong choice on one side of their
platform. For example, a magazine might keep its user
subscription price low by relying on relatively more
advertising, but this may cause subscribers to cancel their
subscriptions due to excessive advertising. As this happens,
the magazine will become less attractive to advertisers,
leading to a vicious cycle of revenue loss on both sides. The
trick for the magazine is to find the “sweet spot” that
optimizes revenue between paid subscribers and paid
advertisers. Such an optimized allocation is a consequence not
merely of the price level on the two sides of the platform, but
also of the amount of participation on each – that is, of
appropriate “participation balanc[ing].”15 This spot, once
achieved, is also an equilibrium for that firm.16 That is, it has

14 See About Us, CONSUMER REP., https://www.consumerreports.org/
cro/about-us/support-our-work/index.htm [https://perma.cc/L75W-HQ9R].
15 See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 11–13), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3219396 [https://perma.cc/5UFG-92XT]; see also Dennis W.
Carlton, The Anticompetitive Effects of Vertical Most-Favored-Nation
Restraints and the Error of Amex, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 93, 101 (2019)
(“The insight of Rochet and Tirole is that a two-sided market has the
property that the price to each side of the market matters separately. That
is, it is not only the sum of the prices that matters but also the relative
prices on each side of the market.”) (citing Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean
Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645
(2006)). Identifying and reaching this sweet spot is sometimes called
“participation balancing.” See Hovenkamp, supra at 12–14.
16 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 13.
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no reason to change the balance as long as circumstances
remain the same. Of course, if something changes that
balance—such as a large postage rate increase for magazine
subscribers—then the firm may have to seek out a new
equilibrium. Significantly, not only the aggregate level of fees,
but also their distribution determines the point that
maximizes the platform operator’s profits.17 The Second
Circuit seemed to ignore this attribute of platforms in Amex,
when it spoke of the network’s profitability as determined by
the “net price” of using the Amex card but said nothing about
participation balancing.18 The same net price might yield very
different levels of output and profits depending on how the
price is distributed between the two sides.
In the platform literature, the term “indirect” network
effects describes situations in which the value of the platform
to one side depends on either the revenue generated or the
number of users on the other side.19 For example, ride-hailing
platforms such as Uber can succeed only if they have a critical
volume of drivers on one side and a critical number of
passengers on the other side. 20 If fares are set too high, the
number of passengers will fall off. If they are set too low, the
number of drivers will fall off. Ongoing antitrust litigation
alleges that Uber is facilitating price fixing among drivers
because its platform computes fares that are the same for
similar rides.21 But platform economics suggests otherwise.
The situation is more similar to the one in Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (“BMI”), a 1979

17 See generally Rochet & Tirole, supra notes 13, 15. See also Dennis W.
Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints and
Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules, 61 J.L. & ECON. 215, 236 (2018);
Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 11–12.
18 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 203 (2d Cir.
2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
19 See generally Rochet & Tirole, supra note 15 ; see also DAVID S. EVANS
& RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW E CONOMICS OF
MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 25 (2016).
20 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 4, 9.
21 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 820–21 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);
see also infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court decision that also involved a two-sided
platform, although the Court did not identify it as such. 22 In
BMI, the Court considered whether nonexclusive licenses,
granted by owners of recorded music and assembled by the
defendant into a “blanket license” granting nonexclusively to
broadcasters, amounted to unlawful price fixing by the
copyright owners.23 The Court held that this practice was not
unlawful, because petitioners’ blanket licenses were a highly
valuable product that could be assembled only by the
cooperation of the participating artists.24 The parallels to the
Uber case are quite strong.
The fact that a platform has two sides does not necessarily
mean that both sides are positive contributors of revenue. It
is important to distinguish between the revenue level, which
is the aggregate price, and the revenue distribution, which is
how the price is divided up among participants on the two
sides.25 Sometimes the price to users on one side of the
platform is zero. For example, traditional “free” over-the-air
television is supported entirely by paid advertising. Viewers
pay nothing for program access. This is also the case for most
consumer web search engines, such as Google Search, Bing,
and Yahoo, and social networking sites such as Facebook.
These services are generally free to users, but are supported
by advertising revenue.26 Nevertheless, those advertising
revenues still depend on the number of users or the number
of page views.
In some cases, as in Amex itself, the revenue from one side
can be negative.27 Credit card companies routinely charge

Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Id. at 8–9 (assuming that the artists were “literally” fixing prices).
24 Id. at 20–21, 24.
25 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 11–12.
26 Some social networking sites, such as LinkedIn, also have a
“premium” version for which users pay a monthly fee. See LinkedIn
Premium,
LINKEDIN,
https://premium.linkedin.com/
[https://perma.cc/LD7E-VWSJ].
27 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2274, 2281 (2018); see also
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 203 n.36 (E.D.N.Y.
22
23
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merchants acceptance fees for the use of the cards, while the
cost to customers can be zero or even negative depending on
the terms of customer card ownership.28 A typical card might
charge no annual fee to customers, and no usage fees other
than interest on unpaid balances or penalties for late
payments. In addition, the card may award “perks” or other
inducements that make the cost of the credit card negative to
the consumer. These can include favorable treatment such as
airline travel miles, extended warranties on products
purchased with the card, or increased insurance protection for
vehicles rented on the card.29 That was largely the case with
Amex’s card offerings: many of the company’s cardholders
paid nothing for ownership of the card but received perks for
each purchase made with it. 30 As a result, it was actually
cheaper to use the card than to pay cash. Significantly, as the
district court noted but the Supreme Court majority
overlooked, these perks are granted for card use, not simply
for card ownership.31 For example, consumers do not receive
product purchase protection simply because they happen to
carry an Amex card in their wallet; they must actually use the
card to make the qualifying purchase.32
Some so-called “transactional” platforms, including credit
card networks and ride-hailing apps, exhibit a very direct

2015) rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
28 The process is described in Steven Semeraro, Settlement Without
Consent: Assessing the Credit Card Merchant Fee Class Action, 2015 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 186, 196 (2015). See generally Dany H. Assaf & Rebecca
Moskowitz, Global Credit Card Wars: Litigation, Legislation, or Innovation
as a Path to Peace, 29 ANTITRUST 42 (2015).
29 See, e.g., infra note 30.
30 Current perks for various classes of American Express credit cards
are summarized at Retail and Travel Benefits, AM. EXPRESS,
https://www.americanexpress.com/us/credit-cards/featuresbenefits/policies/index.html [https://perma.cc/P7SJ-P59T].
31 See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 191.
32 See,
e.g.,
Purchase
Protection,
AM.
EXPRESS,
https://www.americanexpress.com/us/credit-cards/featuresbenefits/policies/purchase-protection/faq.html#5
[https://perma.cc/P3TZ9PMW] (limiting purchase protection to goods purchased with Amex card).
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relationship between transactions on one side and those on
the other.33 The Supreme Court emphasized this in its
peculiar approach to market definition.34 For example, each
time a customer uses an Amex card to make a purchase, the
platform simultaneously logs one transaction on the customer
side and an equal and offsetting transaction on the merchant
side, less Amex’s merchant acceptance fee. 35 The same thing
is true of Uber.36 Each time a passenger hails a ride, the
passenger pays the fare through the Uber application and the
driver is compensated accordingly, after Uber subtracts its
fee. This one-to-one transactional correspondence does not
apply to all two-sided platforms. Health insurance networks,
newspapers, search engines, and streaming sites, for example,
exhibit a less direct relationship between transactions on the
two sides of the market. In a market such as free television,
advertising volume and rates might be based on Nielsen or
other surveys that assess the size and composition of the
audience.37 Advertising rates on a search engine such as
Google are often based on clicks, which means that more
heavily used search engines generate more advertising
33 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018) (citing
Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy & Lacey L. Plache,
Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment
Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 580, 583 (2006)).
34 See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.
35 See id.
36 See Brief of the International Air Transport Association and Airlines
for America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–6, Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16–1454).
37 See Advertising Effectiveness, NIELSEN, https://www.nielsen.com/
us/en/solutions/advertising-effectiveness.html
[https://perma.cc/TLL563FX]; see also United States v. Gray Television, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-02232,
2016 WL 1064377, at *10–11 (D.D.C. Mar. 3, 2016) (noting how television
advertising rates are computed from Nielsen ratings based on audience size
and demographic characteristics). Some pay television contains advertising
as well, and Nielsen data may also be used to compute ad rates for such
products. See, e.g., Dish Enlists Nielsen Digital Measurement to Power
Advanced Advertising Across Sling TV, NIELSEN (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/2018/dish-enlists-nielsendigital-measurement-to-power-advanced-ads-across-sling.html
[https://perma.cc/CM2W-CL93].
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revenue.38 The volume and price of advertising is certainly
affected by these measures of traffic, but it is hardly true that
a one-to-one correspondence exists between a viewer’s activity
and the purchase of advertising.
The antitrust challenge in Amex was to an “antisteering”
rule that Amex imposed upon merchants accepting its credit
cards.39 Amex charges merchants an acceptance fee, typically
a percentage of the transaction price, that can run much
higher than the fee charged by competing credit card issuers
such as Visa, Mastercard, and Discover.40 Many customers
who carry the Amex card likely also carry one or more other
cards.41 This incentivizes the merchant to induce the
customer to use a less costly card, which it might do by
offering the customer a product price discount or other
compensation if she agrees to switch. For example, if the
merchant acceptance fee on a large purchase is thirty dollars
with an Amex card, but only twenty dollars with a Visa card,
the merchant might wish to offer the customer a price
discount of six dollars for using the Visa card rather than
Amex. Alternatively, it might offer free delivery or some other
valuable good or service. The antisteering rule prevents the
merchant from making this offer, or even from informing the
customer that the Amex card was more costly to use. 42 The
rule does not apply to transactions that do not use a card at
all, such as payment by cash or checks, and it does not apply
38 For a summary of how these alternatives compute advertising rates,
see generally Web Tracking Solutions, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., No. 08-CV03139, 2011 WL 3418323 (E.D.N.Y. July 27, 2011) (providing the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation); see also Nathan Newman, Search,
Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG.
401, 413–14 (2014).
39 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2280.
40 The district court found that Amex maintained higher merchant
acceptance fees than rival cards, although the difference had been declining.
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 200 (E.D.N.Y. 2015),
rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). The differences tended to be higher in purchases
involving airlines, rental cars, and lodging. Id.
41 See id. at 178.
42 Id. at 165.
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to debit cards.43 The government alleged that the antisteering
rule effectively forced customers to stay with the higher priced
card, thus increasing not only merchant fees, but also product
prices indirectly.44 Visa and Mastercard also used their own
versions of such provisions, but signed consent judgments
agreeing to abandon the practice.45
“Steering” is fundamental to competition of any kind,
including competition among platforms. It offers market
participants an incentive to seek out lower cost alternatives.
Some platforms are “single-homing,” which means that users
typically engage with only one platform.46 For example,
smartphones are costly, and managing two different phones
would be inconvenient. For that reason, most smartphone
users have only a single phone at a time. iPhone users
purchase their apps on the App Store, and Android users
purchase them on Google Play. Competition for a particular
user exists for the platform—the smartphone itself—rather
than among platform incumbents. Credit cards are different,
however. They readily accommodate “multi-homing.”47
Cardholders often own two or more general purpose credit
cards and use whichever satisfies them most for a particular
transaction. The same is true of ride hailing services, web
browsers, and computer search engines. Competition among
Id.
See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct at 2288–89. As the Supreme Court
described the antisteering rule, it prohibits:
43
44

. . . merchants from implying a preference for non-Amex
cards; dissuading customers from using Amex cards;
persuading customers to use other cards; imposing any
special restrictions, conditions, disadvantages, or fees on
Amex cards; or promoting other cards more than Amex. The
antisteering provisions do not, however, prevent merchants
from steering customers toward debit cards, checks, or cash.
Id. at 2283.
45 See id. at 2293 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Am.
Express Co., No. 10–CV–4496, 2011 WL 2974094, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 20,
2011) (approving proposed consent judgment, 75 Fed. Reg. 62858–02 (Oct.
13, 2010)).
46 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 18–19.
47 See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 17.
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platforms can help ensure competitive prices and high-quality
service, but an antisteering rule, such as Amex’s, eliminates a
consumer’s incentive to use the least costly alternative.
The credit card steering problem presents some analogies
to the existing economic literature on cartels. Limitations on
price competition encourage firms to compete in ways other
than price. For example, although cartel members may be
forbidden from cutting the nominal price, they may compete
with one another on nonprice terms, such as by offering perks
that may be equivalent to those offered for credit card use. 48
At the margin, the cartel members may throw in nonprice
perks right up to the point that their costs equal the price
level. For example, if the competitive price is ten dollars but
the cartel price is fourteen dollars, the cartel members may
end up competing against one another by including nonprice
perks costing them up to four dollars. Even apart from cartels,
however, mixtures of price and nonprice competition are
ubiquitous.
Steering facilitates both price and nonprice competition by
permitting merchants to reward cardholders for using less
costly forms of payment. Card issuers can compete either by
cutting their merchant acceptance fee or by increasing their
perks. With steering, merchants can permit customers to
choose between a lower product price obtained by using a card
with a lower acceptance fee, or a higher-price product
purchased with a card that rewards the customer with higher
perks. An antisteering rule deprives customers of the
opportunity to make this choice, at least among alternative
credit cards. In the process, it serves to blunt both price and
nonprice competition.
Some Amex cardholders place greater value on the perks
than others—a point that the Amex majority overlooked. It
assumed that the higher transaction fees are justified by
increased perks, as if they conferred the same value to
48 See generally George J. Stigler, Price and Non-Price Competition, 76
J. POL. ECON. 149 (1968). On application to transactions and merchant
credit card fees, see Carlton & Winter, supra note 17, at 218, 230. See also
In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015) (treating
a rise in non-price competition as evidence of collusion).
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everyone. The very fact that steering worked, however,
indicates that at least some Amex customers preferred the
lower product price rather than the perks. Were that not true,
a steering rule would not have been necessary.
This Article considers how antitrust’s rule of reason should
be applied to an exclusionary practice on a platform market.
It considers the rule of reason’s basic burden-shifting
framework, unique elements of market delineation on
platform markets and the relevance of placing production
complements into the same “market.” It also considers the
Court’s regressive, antieconomic conclusion on a proposition
that was never briefed—whether a market definition is
necessary in an antitrust challenge to a vertical practice. Then
it considers the Court’s odd treatment of free rider problems.
It also faults the Court for paying so little attention to the
record, its lack of economic analysis, and in particular its
confusion of total with marginal harms and benefits. Finally,
it looks at the implications of the Court’s decision for market
delineation in cases involving platforms.

II. THE AMEX CASE IN THE SUPREME COURT
In Amex, the Supreme Court dismissed the government’s
challenge to the Amex antisteering rule,49 affirming the
Second Circuit’s decision reversing the district court. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that antitrust’s rule of reason
involves a “three-step, burden-shifting framework[.]”50 First,
the plaintiff must show “that the challenged restraint has a
substantial anticompetitive effect that harms consumers in
the relevant market.”51 If the plaintiff carries this burden,
“then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a
procompetitive rationale[.]”52 If this showing is successful,
“then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate
that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably

49
50
51
52

Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2290.
Id. at 2284.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
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achieved through less anticompetitive means.”53 Because the
dissenters agreed with this verbal formulation of the rule of
reason, it appears to have the unanimous support of the
Court.54 The differences lay mainly in how the prima facie
case must be made out and how market power is to be
established.
The Court concluded that the government did not carry its
burden at the first stage. It observed that anticompetitive
effects could be shown in two ways—either “directly,” by
“‘proof of actual detrimental effects on competition,’”55 which
could include “reduced output, increased prices, or decreased
quality in the relevant market[.]”56 It could also be shown
“indirectly,” by “proof of market power plus some evidence
that the challenged restraint harms competition.”57 As the
dissent observed, both of these descriptions were inconsistent
with traditionally accepted requirements under the rule of
reason. First, “direct” proof of actual detrimental effects does
not require a market definition;58 however, the majority spoke
of direct evidence of “reduced output, increased prices, or
decreased quality in the relevant market” as if it did.59 As
Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his dissent, “[o]ne critical
point that the majority’s argument ignores is that proof of

Id.
See id. at 2290 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I agree with the majority
and the parties that this case is properly evaluated under the three-step
‘rule of reason’[.]”).
55 Id. at 2284 (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460
(1986)).
56 Id. (internal citations omitted).
57 Id. (citing Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97 (2d
Cir. 1998); Spanish Broad. Sys. of Fla. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 376
F.3d 1065, 1073 (11th Cir. 2004)).
58 E.g., 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & JOHN L. SOLOW,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶521 (4th ed. 2014); Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define
Markets, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010).
59 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2284. The Court cited FTC v. Ind.
Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986), but that decision never spoke of
relevant market.
53
54
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actual adverse effects on competition is, a fortiori, proof of
market power.”60 The dissent continued:
The District Court’s findings of actual anticompetitive
harm from the nondiscrimination provisions thus
showed that, whatever the relevant market might be,
American Express had enough power in that market
to cause that harm. There is no reason to require a
separate showing of market definition and market
power under such circumstances. And so the
majority’s extensive discussion of market definition is
legally unnecessary. 61

Second, the Court’s formulation of “indirect” proof as
requiring “proof of market power plus some evidence that the
challenged restraint harms competition”62 resembles the
general case for competitive harm under the rule of reason,
but misses the point of “indirect” proof, which is that it draws
inferences of market power from a market share and other
features of a properly defined relevant market.
In Amex, the plaintiff had relied on direct proof, which
would not ordinarily require a market definition. As discussed
below, however, the Court held that for vertical cases such as
this one, even direct proof required a market definition.63 The
Court then concluded that the relevant market consists of
both sides of the platform as “the area of effective
competition.”64 For example, firms such as the defendant earn
a profit by maximizing revenue across both sides of the
platform and can do so even if one side operates at a loss. 65
Further, “[p]rice increases on one side of the platform likewise
do not suggest anticompetitive effects without some evidence
that they have increased the overall cost of the platform’s
services.”66

60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2284.
See infra text accompanying notes 76–77.
Id. at 2285–86.
See id.
Id. at 2286.
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The Court cited a great deal of literature on distinctive
features of two-sided platforms. It concluded that “in twosided transaction markets, only one market should be
defined.”67 Why these observations entailed that
noncompeting goods should be grouped into the same relevant
market is not clear. The price and output of complements
certainly affect a firm’s profit-maximizing output and price,68
but that hardly requires redefinition of its market.69 Further,
the Court’s discussion about the “transactional”70 nature of
Amex’s platform applies to conventional markets where
sellers and buyers meet face to face. It is hardly unique to
platforms. For example, if a gardener pays three dollars for a
packet of spinach seeds in a hardware store there is a single
simultaneous transaction, but we would never define a single
market for gardeners and spinach seeds.
Without relying on an economically incoherent conception
of a relevant market, the Court could simply have said that
when power is sought to be proven by direct effects all relevant
effects should be considered. It does not matter whether these
effects occur in the same relevant market, because no relevant
market need be defined in the first place. This is more
consistent with Justice Breyer’s dissenting approach which (1)
67 Id. at 2287 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lapo Filistrucchi,
Damien Geradin, Eric van Damme & Pauline Affeldt, Market Definition in
Two–Sided Markets: Theory and Practice, 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
293, 302 (2014); see also David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust
Markets When Firms Operate Two–Sided Platforms, 2005 C OLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 667, 671 (2005)).
68 In general, the presence of a substitute serves to increase a firm’s
own price elasticity of demand, thus reducing its power; the presence of a
complement serves to reduce a firm’s own price elasticity of demand, thus
increasing its power. Both are considered in ordinary methodologies for
computing residual demand. See generally Aviv Nevo, Mergers with
Differentiated Products: The Case of the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry,
31 RAND J. ECON. 395 (2000); Gregory J. Werden, Demand Elasticities in
Antitrust Analysis, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 363 (1998). On application to twosided platforms, see generally Andre Boik & Kenneth S. Corts, The Effects
of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry, 59 J.
L. & ECON. 105 (2016).
69 See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
70 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286–87.
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eschewed reliance on market definition;71 but (2) would
consider all effects rather than just benefits on one side of the
platform.72 The district court was also clear on that point,
although the majority opinion ignored it. Indeed, one of the
district court’s fact findings was that the antisteering rule
resulted in higher product prices across the board for
merchants who accepted the Amex card, whether or not the
customer used that card. 73 That finding alone was sufficient
to establish the defendant’s power, as well as anticompetitive
effects.
In a footnote, the Court concluded that while direct proof
of market power does not require proof of a relevant market
in a horizontal case, it did in a vertical case such as this. The
Court stated:
The plaintiffs argue that we need not define the
relevant market in this case because they have offered
actual evidence of adverse effects on competition—
namely, increased merchant fees. We disagree. The
cases that the plaintiffs cite for this proposition
evaluated whether horizontal restraints had an
adverse effect on competition. . . . Given that
horizontal restraints involve agreements between
competitors not to compete in some way, this Court
concluded that it did not need to precisely define the
relevant market to conclude that these agreements
were anticompetitive. . . . But vertical restraints are
different. Vertical restraints often pose no risk to
competition unless the entity imposing them has
market power, which cannot be evaluated unless the
Court first defines the relevant market.74

This confusing statement appears to do no more than
assume the conclusion. The Court did not clarify why

See id. at 2294–96.
See id. at 2296–97.
73 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 208
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018); see also infra notes 146–53 and
accompanying text.
74 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7 (internal citations omitted).
71
72

No. 1:35]

PLATFORMS AND THE RULE OF REASON

51

horizontal and vertical restraints should be treated differently
in situations where both require proof of market power. One
possibility, which Justice Breyer mentioned in his dissent, is
that the majority believed that there was some category of
anticompetitive effects that could be established without
market power.75 The final sentence of the statement appears
to conclude as a statement of law something that in reality
presents a question of fact, and that in any event is incorrect.
There is no obvious reason why power cannot be inferred from
effects in both horizontal and vertical cases. For example, in
exclusive dealing cases, which are vertical, evidence that a
defendant was able to exclude a rival or suppress its sales
even while keeping its own price high is certainly probative,
as the Eleventh Circuit found in McWane, Inc. v. FTC.76
Direct proof has its own limitations, of course. The facts must
indicate that exclusion is a consequence of anticompetitive
behavior rather than efficiency, but there is no obvious reason
for thinking these things are fundamentally different in a
vertical case.
Further, the Court’s analysis is regressive, given the
significant work in economics that both weakens the case for
traditional market definition and improves upon econometric
methodologies for measuring market power more directly.77
This is particularly true when the immediate concern is the
ability of a firm or group of firms to increase price above the
competitive level through means other than collusion.78 When
the issue is likelihood of collusion, on the other hand, then
market definition may be an aid in identifying those in the

75 See id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“One critical point that the
majority’s argument ignores is that proof of actual adverse effects on
competition is, a fortiori, proof of market power.”).
76 See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 829–32 (11th Cir. 2015).
77 See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 58.
78 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57
ANTITRUST BULL. 887 (2012); Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 68
(2010) (noting the move away from traditional market definition in merger
analysis); Gregory J. Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice
Department’s Merger Guidelines, 1983 DUKE L.J. 514, 572–74 (1983).

52

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

collusive group, and also their relative strengths as cartel
contributors or enforcers.79 The alarming thing about the
Court’s footnote is that it does not engage or even cite any of
the extensive literature on the measurement of market power,
providing not one single empirical rationale for the conclusion
it draws. Indeed, the proposition that the Court asserted –
namely, that a plaintiff in any vertical restraints case must
define a relevant market no matter how power is sought to be
established –was never briefed. Further, the Court stated this
conclusion as a rule of law. Clearly, the permissible
methodologies for proving power—a question of expert
testimony—should be a question of fact.
Market definition is even less reliable as an indicator of
power in markets of significantly differentiated products. 80
Market definition is necessarily binary, putting products
either inside or outside of the market. Placing differentiated
products in the same market serves to exaggerate the degree
of competition. Placing a differentiated product outside serves
to understate the degree of competition. Amex concerned
differentiated payment systems, as well as differentiation in
costs and perks within the group of general purpose credit
cards. Further, the fundamental concern was with high prices
but not with collusion among issuers. In that case, measuring
market power by reference to share of a defined market seems
distinctly inferior.
In any event, the Court then held that the proper relevant
market for considering the restraint at issue was both sides of
the platform.81 It also referred to “credit-card transactions as

79 These are principal attributes of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
which is often used in merger enforcement and requires a market definition.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 12.4 (5th ed. 2016); John Kwoka, Reviving
Merger Control: A Comprehensive Plan for Reforming Policy and Practice
7–8 (Oct. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.antitrust
institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Kwoka-Reviving-Merger-ControlOctober-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX3Z-CKE2].
80 See 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 58, at ¶ 563; Herbert Hovenkamp,
Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2146 (2012).
81 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018).
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a whole” as the relevant market.82 That odd usage, of grouping
both the buyer and seller into the same relevant market,
would make any coherent economic analysis of the relevant
market impossible, which is apparently why the opinion
limited this definition to credit card transactions rather than
transactions generally. Since every sale in a market involves
a transaction, a broader conclusion would require holding that
the spinach seeds and the gardener who purchases them are
in the same market simply because they are simultaneously
on the buy- and sell-side of the same transaction.
Concluding that credit card transactions make up the
relevant market should also have given the decision to the
plaintiff. The record established unambiguously that the
antisteering rule forced a specific buyer and seller to replace
a lower price transaction that both preferred in favor of a
higher cost transaction that injured both of them, as well as
rival card issuers. 83 In other words, it established exclusion,
harm to the affected parties, and higher prices across the
board.
Importantly, the Court cabined this noneconomic market
definition conclusion in other ways, adding this critical
limitation:
To be sure, it is not always necessary to consider both
sides of a two-sided platform. A market should be
treated as one sided when the impacts of indirect
network effects and relative pricing in that market are
minor. Newspapers that sell advertisements, for
example, arguably operate a two-sided platform
because the value of an advertisement increases as
more people read the newspaper. But in the
newspaper-advertisement market, the indirect
networks effects operate in only one direction;
newspaper readers are largely indifferent to the
amount of advertising that a newspaper contains.
Because of these weak indirect network effects, the
market for newspaper advertising behaves much like
a one-sided market and should be analyzed as such.
82
83

Id. at 2287.
See infra notes 180–91 and accompanying text.
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But two-sided transaction platforms, like the
credit-card market, are different. These platforms
facilitate a single, simultaneous transaction between
participants. For credit cards, the network can sell its
services only if a merchant and cardholder both
simultaneously choose to use the network. Thus,
whenever a credit-card network sells one transaction’s
worth of card-acceptance services to a merchant it also
must sell one transaction’s worth of card-payment
services to a cardholder. It cannot sell transaction
services to either cardholders or merchants
individually. To optimize sales, the network must find
the balance of pricing that encourages the greatest
number of matches between cardholders and
merchants.84

Platforms that “facilitate a single, simultaneous
transaction between participants”85 would include the credit
card networks and very likely also ride-sharing platforms,
such as Uber or Lyft, and perhaps eBay or Airbnb, which
function mainly as brokers between buyers and sellers. The
Court itself acknowledged that it would not include platforms
such as newspapers, where there is no transaction-specific
relationship between the two sides. A fortiori, it does not
include television or radio stations that accept advertising
revenue from one side. Nor would it include advertisingsupported computer search engines, music streaming, or other
advertiser-supported computer applications in which
advertising satisfies the company’s general revenue
requirements, but there is no one-to-one transaction between
the user and the advertiser. And it would exclude networks
that sell things such as health insurance, where the buyer and
seller do not engage in simultaneous transactions on a perservice basis.86
The Court concluded that assessing competitive effects of
a two-sided transaction platform required the fact finder to

84
85
86

Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (citations omitted).
Id.
See infra note 215 and accompanying text.
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evaluate both sides.87 Here, the Court held, the plaintiffs had
not carried their burden:
Focusing on merchant fees alone misses the mark
because the product that credit-card companies sell is
transactions, not services to merchants, and the
competitive effects of a restraint on transactions
cannot be judged by looking at merchants alone.
Evidence of a price increase on one side of a two-sided
transaction platform cannot by itself demonstrate an
anticompetitive exercise of market power. To
demonstrate anticompetitive effects on the two-sided
credit-card market as a whole, the plaintiffs must
prove that Amex’s antisteering provisions increased
the cost of credit-card transactions above a
competitive level, reduced the number of credit-card
transactions, or otherwise stifled competition in the
credit-card market.88

Further, the majority concluded, “[t]he plaintiffs did not
offer any evidence that the price of credit-card transactions
was higher than the price one would expect to find in a
competitive market.”89 Rather, “Amex’s increased merchant
fees reflect increases in the value of its services and the cost
of its transactions, not an ability to charge above a competitive
price.”90
What the Court said could not possibly have been true of
potential customers who would have agreed to a steering offer.
Clearly, they did not value the perks by more than the
merchant’s offered inducement, or else they would not have
preferred to switch. That is, the relevant question concerned
the marginal effect on consumers and merchants that
resulted from the no steering rule.91 It is also worth noting
that proof of any of these things does not rest on the premise
that the merchant and customer sides of the platform were in
the same relevant market. Further, the majority opinion
87
88
89
90
91

Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2287.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 2288.
Id.
See infra notes 183–88 and accompanying text.
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ignored numerous explicit fact findings in the district court,
all of which took effects on both sides into account but were
based on an economically coherent market definition.92
The Court also concluded that a dealer offering a discount
to customers for purchasing with an alternative card was a
form of free riding that “undermines the cardholder’s
expectation of ‘welcome acceptance’—the promise of a
frictionless transaction.”93 “A lack of welcome acceptance at
one merchant makes a cardholder less likely to use Amex at
all other merchants.”94 The Court described this “lack of
welcome acceptance” as an “externality” that “endangers the
viability of the entire Amex network,”95 and likened the
situation to the use of resale price maintenance to prevent one
seller from free riding on the efforts of a competing seller.96

III. OBSERVATIONS: APPLYING THE RULE OF
REASON TO PLATFORM EXCLUSION
A. The Significance of Burden Shifting
While all members of the Court nominally agreed with the
rule of reason’s three-part burden-shifting analysis, the
majority appeared to believe that the entire antitrust
challenge depended on the plaintiff’s prima facie case. Some
writers on two-sided platforms make the same mistake,
92 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 174
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (“American Express is correct that
the court must account for the two-sided features of the credit card
industry[.]”). The Second Circuit acknowledged this as well, but apparently
concluded that benefits could be assessed only with a market definition that
included both sides. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 199–
200 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274
(2018); see also infra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
93 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289 (citing Am. Express Co., 88 F.
Supp. 3d at 156).
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 2289–90 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–91. (2007)); see also infra notes 134–38 and
accompanying text.
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faulting analyses such as the district court’s for looking only
at one side of the market. 97 But that clearly is not what the
district court did in this case, and it is not the proper way to
think of the burden shifting rule-of-reason framework. The
prima facie case considers whether the plaintiff has presented
enough evidence of competitive harm to require the defendant
to offer an explanation.98 Because the defendant is the creator
of its restraint and presumably knows what its motives were,
it is in a far better position to provide proof of its rationale and
effects. If it had a procompetitive justification, such as cost
reduction or product improvement, that must have been a
motivating factor in its creation of the restraint.99 In any
event, the district court made clear that its analysis
considered both sides of the market even under the burden
shifting approach.100

B. Platform Market Delineation
The majority never explained why assessing effects on both
sides of a platform required jettisoning economically coherent
conceptions of the relevant market as a group of substitute
goods or services. That is, a relevant market is a “collusive
group.”101 Putting production complements into the same
market simply because making a deal requires both
introduces economic nonsense into the law and economics of
market power. Superior techniques exist for evaluating the
pricing relationship among substitutes and complements, and

See, e.g., Filistrucchi et al., supra note 67, at 301.
See supra text accompanying notes 50–51.
99 See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at ¶ 1505a; Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 107 (2018).
100 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 171
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
101 See, e.g., Kenneth D. Boyer, Industry Boundaries, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS & ANTITRUST LAW 70, 73–74 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds.,
2d ed. 1988); Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market
Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 188–89 (1992).
97
98
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their effects on market power.102 These techniques do not
require abandonment of sensible economics. In some cases,
however, they may serve to strengthen or weaken the
inference of power that can be drawn from computation of a
market share. Unfortunately, parties will likely waste many
hours of litigation resources disputing whether the “relevant
market” in their particular case should include complements
as well as substitutes.
As Justice Breyer observed in his dissent, “[t]he phrase
‘two-sided transaction platform’ is not one of antitrust
art[.]”103 The important points, as he observed, are that such
platforms “(1) offer different products or services, (2) to
different groups of customers, (3) whom the ‘platform’
connects, (4) in simultaneous transactions.”104 But the
majority made no attempt to explain why this set of facts
required the Court to develop an economically incoherent
conception of the relevant market.
The dissent’s logic here is inescapable. Market definition
and market share are only the starting points in the analysis
of market power by indirect measures. At that point, a court
must consider a number of things that give meaning to market
shares.105 The Second Circuit lost sight of this when it held
that the district court could not have accounted for the twosided features of the credit-card industry without a market
definition that included both.106 When relying on proof from
market share, a far better approach is to start out with a
102 For an introduction, see generally Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral
Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis, 11 ANTITRUST 21 (1997).
See also Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Empirical Methods
of Identifying and Measuring Market Power, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 3 (1992). For
an updated and somewhat more critical overview, see Daniel A. Crane,
Market Power Without Market Definition, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31 (2014).
103 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2298 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
104 Id.
105 See 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 58, at ¶¶ 532–33.
106 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 196, 200 (2d
Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
The Supreme Court did not discuss the fact finding. See generally Am.
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274.
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properly defined group of substitutes and then consider other
factors that might strengthen or weaken any inference of
power drawn from market share. In this case, the alleged
relevant market and the one the district court focused on was
economically sensible—namely a “network services market”
for general purpose charge cards, in which the purchasers
were merchants.107 To this, the Second Circuit required the
addition of cardholders. 108 Cardholder transactions were not
competitors with network services, but rather were
complements in production.109
It is difficult to see any added value coming from a
linguistic requirement that both sides of the platform be
placed within the same market. 110 It certainly cannot be to
assess collusion possibilities because the two sides do not
compete with each other. The presence of a second side may
affect the ability of the first side to exercise power, but no part
of that determination requires a conclusion that the second
side is in the same market. The availability or price of
complements can certainly limit a firm’s ability to increase its
price. For example, the limited supply and high price of
gasoline might limit a firm’s ability to charge a higher price
for its automobiles. This is another way of saying that
substitutes and complements pull in opposite directions when
one is estimating a firm’s market power: high prices for
substitutes tend to increase it, while high prices for
complements tend to decrease it. 111 Economists have been

107 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 171
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d., 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
108 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 197.
109 See infra at notes 132–133 and accompanying text.
110 See Carlton, supra note 15.
111 See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text; see also Werden,
supra note 68, at 398. Conceptually, a firm’s market power is determined
by its own price elasticity of demand, which is the weighted sum of the cross
elasticities of all other products with respect to the first product’s price. See
Kaplow, supra note 58, at 485–86. In practice, direct measurement of a
firm’s own price elasticity is easier than, and preferable to, attempts to
measure cross-elasticities with potentially competing products. Id. at 490.
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making such calculations for decades, 112 and without doing
anything as irrational as grouping substitutes and
complements into a single market.
What the Supreme Court majority was apparently trying
to do is force the plaintiff to consider burdens and benefits on
both sides of the platform as part of its prima facie case. The
district court seems to have done that quite adequately,113 but
it did not add the verbal flourish that the two sides were in a
single relevant market. How its analysis would have been any
different if it had done so is not clear.
The Second Circuit expressed concern that limiting the
market to substitutes would ignore “feedback effects”—
namely that a “reduction in cardholders’ demand for cards (or
card transactions) . . . would accompany any degree of
merchant attrition.”114 Of course, that would be true of any
firm that sold complementary products. For example, a grocer
that sells both milk and Cheerios would have to consider that
a price increase in milk might reduce the demand for
Cheerios. This would not warrant creating a single market for
milk and Cheerios, although it might require the fact finder
to consider what impact reduced demand for Cheerios might
have on the profitability of the higher-priced milk. That is
fundamentally a demand elasticity problem, not a problem in
market delineation, and further illustrates why the Court’s
insistence on a traditional market definition in a vertical case
makes so little sense. In an extreme case, an increase in the
price of milk might impact Cheerios so severely as to make it
an unsustainable product. In all events, the “feedback”
equilibrium depends on all market conditions, including price,
that operate on both sides of the platform. A judicial order
permitting steering would simply move this equilibrium to a
different place. In general, the more competitive the two sides
of the market are, the less profitable this equilibrium would
112 See Werden, supra note 68, at 398 (citing JOE S. BAIN, PRICE THEORY
25–26, 50–53 (1952); FRITZ MACHLUP, THE ECONOMICS OF SELLERS
COMPETITION 213–14 (1952)).
113 See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
114 United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 200 (2d Cir. 2016),
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
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be. In any event, a lost transaction to Amex would be a gained
transaction to a lower priced network, affecting the latter’s
feedback effect as well.
Indeed, the district court also used a version of this
feedback argument to make the opposite point, and its
analysis was more persuasive. It concluded that the impact of
the antisteering rule was to create “derived demand” for the
Amex card by deterring customers from switching away,
which in turn supported increased merchant fees.115 This was
more persuasive because it considered marginal—rather than
average—behavior. The reason this rationale is more
persuasive is that each and every customer who would have
switched away from Amex as a result of steering in fact
experienced a loss in value, as did each and every merchant
forced to make the transaction using the Amex card.116 There
were no gains on either side, but rather losses on both. Profits
accrued only to the network operator, not to merchants or card
users. The only remaining question was whether the
antisteering rule was necessary to provide the minimum
volume necessary for the network operator’s viability.
Assuming that is a viable defense, one does not need a special
theory of platforms in order to answer that question.
Similar situations can arise in exclusive dealing cases,
where viability of production facilities is sometimes raised as
a defense. Suppose, for example, that Uber should impose
exclusive dealing117 on its drivers, preventing them from
driving for any competing company. To the extent Uber had
the power to do so, this would prevent the drivers from selling
their services to rivals such as Lyft or traditional taxicabs.
One standard defense, as presented in Amex, would be that
exclusive dealing is necessary to increase volume in order to
make the Uber platform viable. That is a testable fact.
115 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 188
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
116 See infra notes 180–91 and accompanying text.
117 More specifically, this would be an output contract, in which
exclusive dealing is imposed on sellers rather than buyers. See 11 HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1803 (4th ed. 2018).
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However, it could also be raised as a defense to any exclusive
dealing claim, whether or not it involved a transactional
network or any network at all. For example, in McWane, a
more conventional exclusive dealing case, the defendant
argued that exclusive dealing was necessary for it to maintain
minimum viable scale in one of its plants. 118 The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that McWane did not show it needed
exclusive dealing in order to get its volume up.119 Given its
very high profit margins, it should simply have cut its
prices.120
By the same token, the evidence in Amex pertained to
whether the antisteering rule was needed to protect Amex’s
scale of operations necessary to keep its platform viable. Here,
the record was clear. Amex offered high-cost cards and
continuously raised its merchant prices under the
antisteering rule.121 None of that depended on the fact that
Amex was operating on a transaction platform. Even
assuming that Amex had to increase card usage in order to
make its platform viable—a fact that was never established—
it might have achieved viability by cutting its price. Further,
the opinion says nothing about what Amex’s viability
requirements were. As the district court observed and Justice
Breyer noted, at trial Amex “presented no expert testimony,
financial analysis, or other direct evidence establishing that
without its [nondiscrimination provisions] it will, in fact, be
unable to adapt its business to a more competitive market.”122
Finally, the viability question is not one of networks, but
rather of plain, old economies of scale or perhaps of scope.

See McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 841 (11th Cir. 2015).
See id.
120 See id.
121 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2293 (2018) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (noting that “American Express raised the prices it charged
merchants on 20 separate occasions.”).
122 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 2015),
rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,
138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018)).
118
119
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Properly conducted antitrust law already requires analysis
of two sides in cases of vertical interbrand restraints,
including the tying of complementary products, although it
does not proceed by anything as economically incoherent as
putting them into the same relevant market.123 The law of
tying and exclusive dealing both assess competitive effects by
examining power in a primary market and foreclosure in a
secondary market. Typically, as in Amex, the two products are
complements. The principal exception is tying law’s
inappropriate but nevertheless tenacious per se rule, which
permits an anticompetitive tie to be inferred without
reference to foreclosure.124
To illustrate, in Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, the Supreme
Court dismissed a challenge to a hospital-anesthesiology
services tie under the rule of reason after finding that the
defendant hospital’s admission of thirty percent of the
surgical patients in the relevant market was inadequate. 125
Importantly, the Court did not define a single market for
anesthesiologists and surgical patients. Hospitals, it should
be noted, are two-sided platforms servicing providers on one
side and patients on the other.
Anticompetitive harm in vertical interbrand foreclosure
cases such as Jefferson Parish requires a showing of some
degree of presence in the primary market and some minimum
amount of foreclosure, exclusion, or perhaps a price increase
in the complementary market. 126 For example, in the wellknown Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. exclusive
dealing case, the utility controlled a dominant position in the
market for electric power in its service area and consumed
eighteen percent of the coal consumed in Florida and
123 Cf. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 171 (including effects on the
other side of the market expressly).
124 See 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & H ERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
1720 (4th ed. 2018).
125 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7, 26–27 (1984)
(noting that defendant lacked power because seventy percent of surgical
patients in the area went to other hospitals).
126 On market definition for purposes of assessing vertical foreclosure,
see 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 58, at ¶ 570.

64

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

Georgia.127 Under existing exclusive dealing standards, that
percentage would have been sufficient for illegality.128 The
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, however, because
the coal that it purchased represented “less than 1% of the
total marketed production” of coal that was available for
Tampa Electric to purchase. 129 The Court did not attempt to
define a single market for coal and electric power. Indeed,
doing so would have undermined the competitive analysis.
Looking at the Tampa utility’s side of the market alone
seriously exaggerated the competitive harm. In Tampa
Electric, the Court got to the correct result by limiting both
the upstream and downstream markets to substitutes and
then assessing the competitive harm. As Justice Breyer
queried in Amex, “What is it about the economic relationship
between merchant-related and shopper-related services that
would justify the majority’s novel approach to market
definition?”130 Economically speaking, the analysis of market
pairs for purposes of evaluating vertical interbrand restraints
is no different from the analysis of platforms. 131

C. Complements in Use or Production
On the question of complements, the Amex majority
concluded that the two sides of the transaction were not
complements because they were not purchased by the same
buyers.132 The dissent countered that they were, and that
putting complements and substitutes into the same market

127

See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 331

(1961).
128 See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295, 305
(1949) (condemning exclusive dealing contracts covering 6.7% of total
retailed gasoline).
129 Tampa Electric, 365 U.S. at 331.
130 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2299 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
131 On this point, see generally Carlton & Winter, supra note 17.
132 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 n.8 (asserting that the two were
not complements “in which both products are bought by the same buyers”
(quoting Filistrucchi et al., supra note 67, at 297)).
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was “economic nonsense.”133 What neither side stated clearly
was that the two sides were clearly complements, but they
were complements in production rather than use. The
majority was thinking of complements in use, such as toast
and jam, or gardeners and spinach seed. Complements in
production are goods or services that are produced together,
such as beef and cowhide, oil and natural gas, lumber and
sawdust, or voice services and messaging services. The
majority’s acknowledgement that each cardholder transaction
is necessarily offset by an equal merchant transaction
acknowledged as much.134 Complements in production behave
in ways similar to complements in use. For example, strong
demand for oil leads to higher oil prices. Necessarily, however,
increasing oil production will increase gas production because
gas is a natural byproduct. If the demand for gas remains
constant, its price will fall just as oil prices rise.

D. Free Rider Concerns
The majority was confused about the existence and nature
of free riding. It spoke of the other card companies as free
riding on Amex’s “investments in rewards[,]” likening the
antisteering provision to the use of resale price maintenance
to protect against dealer free riding.135 But as the dissent
properly noted, the Amex rewards attach to specific
transactions, not to mere possession of the card.136 If a
cardholder earned its perks simply by owning an Amex card,
then, of course, free riding would be possible. A customer
might acquire the card in order to obtain the perks but then
make its actual transactions with a lower priced card. The
majority paid little attention to the record, but the district

133 Id. at 2295–96 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 2B AREEDA ET AL.,
supra note 58, at ¶ 565a, at 431).
134 See id. at 2286.
135 See id. at 2289–90 (citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–91 (2007)).
136 Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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court was clear on the point 137 and it seems incontrovertible.
The policy is clear on Amex’s own website.138
The all-important ingredient in the free-rider explanation
of resale price maintenance or other dealer restraints is that
the manufacturer is unable to price out services distinctly
from the product itself. For example, it cannot charge
customers separately for the well-trained sales staff but must
include it in the price of the basic product. That makes it
possible for the customer to segregate the two—obtaining
product education from the full-service dealer, but then
purchasing the product from the discounter.139 However, if
the issuer attaches the perks strictly to payment for the
product, then “the ride is not free,” in Judge Frank
Easterbrook’s words.140
The majority’s free rider argument was attached to a
perspective on consumer behavior that can only be described
as economically bizarre, and certainly contrary to our usual
assumption that consumers are rational maximizers of their
own utility. The majority spoke of the antisteering provision
as promoting “welcome acceptance” of its card.141 “Welcome
acceptance” in this case apparently meant that the buyer
137 United States v. Am. Express Co, 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 237 (E.D.N.Y.
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). (“Plainly . . . investments tied to card use (such
as Membership Rewards points, purchase protection, and the like) are not
subject to free-riding, since the network does not incur any cost if the
cardholder is successfully steered away from using his or her American
Express card.”).
138 See, e.g., Extended Warranty Description of Coverage, AM. EXPRESS
https://www.americanexpress.com/content/dam/amex/us/creditcards/features-benefits/policies/pdf/EW%20Benefit%20Guide_Tier%
201%20Rev%2007-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8TEZ-HNNL]
(describing
extended warranty protection offered with Amex Platinum Card, provided
that the product in question was purchased with the card).
139 See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?,
3 J.L. & ECON. 86, 91–92 (1960); see also 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1613 (4th ed. 2017).
140 Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 675 (7th Cir.
1992) (“When payment is possible, free-riding is not a problem because the
‘ride’ is not free.”).
141 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2289.
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should be prevented from being offered or even told about the
availability of a cheaper alternative. Amex made this
argument in its brief, offered as a Hail Mary pass, which the
majority caught.142 The Second Circuit had decided that
“welcome acceptance” was a viable defense because loss of a
sale via steering could have a negative impact on both sides of
the market.143 Factually, of course, it could be true that loss
of “welcome acceptance” on one product could impair a firm’s
earnings on a complementary product. For example,
condemnation of a cartel’s boycott of a price cutter in its
primary market could also have a negative impact on the sales
of a complement, or impairing a grocer’s milk sales might also
harm that grocer’s sale of Cheerios. By contrast, the district
court took a much more economically rational view of the
situation, namely that “[a]llowing merchants to actively
participate in their customers’ point-of-sale decisions would
remove the artificial barrier that now segregates merchant
demand from the price of network services[.]”144
Putting the most sensible gloss on the argument, Amex
had invested in a business model that depended on high
merchant acceptance fees. When a merchant offered a
customer a lower price to use a different card, that offer
undermined Amex’s model. Factually, of course, that is true.
Anytime a merchant tells a buyer that a better deal is
available than the buyer’s initially chosen one it serves to
diminish “welcome acceptance” of that initial offer. Indeed,
competition of any sort does that. One wonders if that
argument, which now has the majority’s imprimatur, will also
142 See Brief for Respondents Am. Express Co. & Am. Express Travel
Related Servs. Co., Inc. at 9, Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (No. 16-1454).
143 See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 191 (2d Cir.
2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (“Although
merchants across various industries regularly try to ‘steer’ their customers
toward certain purchasing decisions via strategic product placement,
discounts, and other deals, steering within the credit-card industry can be
harmful insofar as it interferes with a network’s ability to balance its twosided net price.”).
144 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 220–21
(E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016, aff’d sub nom. Ohio v.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
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appear as a defense to price fixing. After all, permitting rivals
to offer a lower price than the cartel’s offer will undermine
“welcome acceptance” of the cartel’s product.145
Further, the majority failed to observe the one instance of
free riding that the facts indicated. The antisteering rule
made the Amex cardholder indifferent as to which card he or
she used, because the increased cost was borne entirely by the
merchant. The merchant for its part had to absorb these
higher costs, which it did via higher product prices, as the
district court also found.146 Effectively, all purchasers,
whether they used an Amex card or any card at all, were
forced to subsidize Amex’s higher merchant acceptance fees.
That was a true case of free riding.
The Second Circuit did not disagree with this fact finding,
but it held that higher product prices could be justified by the
greater value of Amex’s perks to its own cardholders,
particularly for merchants where Amex cardholders insisted
on paying with the Amex card and nothing else.147 What the
Second Circuit apparently did not see is that this finding
conceded Amex’s market power: that is, it had the power to
compel higher merchant product prices across the board in
order to subsidize Amex’s perks to its own cardholders. A firm
that lacked power would not be able to compel higher prices
market wide, harming everyone else for the benefit of its own
customers. The Supreme Court did not discuss the Second
Circuit’s treatment of the issue.

E. Use of the Record
One of the rule of reason’s most essential features is
development and analysis of a record. The rule of reason
requires detailed factual analysis because the restraint is not
of a type that can be disposed of categorically, as under per se
rules of illegality or legality.148 The Brooke Group, Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. predatory pricing case
145
146
147
148

See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 31.
See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 202.
See 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 1507–08.
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provides an instructive example, where the Supreme Court
carefully reviewed the record, citing it nearly twenty times
and ultimately agreeing with the district court that the
plaintiff’s legal case had failed. 149
By contrast, the Supreme Court’s Amex opinion contains
only a single mention of the record, for a proposition unrelated
to the challenged restraint, and virtually no analysis. 150 The
Second Circuit had discussed the record multiple times,
mainly concerning the district court’s conclusion that the
relevant market must be limited to reasonably
interchangeable goods. The Second Circuit also concluded
that harms to merchants needed to be offset by benefits to
cardholders, and that only a market definition that grouped
the two together could do that.151 It did not acknowledge that
for cardholders affected by the antisteering rule, the benefits
were necessarily less than the higher fees. 152 The Supreme
Court did not discuss these findings either. On the district
court’s finding of higher retail prices, the Second Circuit held
that this conclusion was error because it “fail[ed] to take into
account offsetting benefits to cardholders in the form of
rewards and other services.”153 That was tantamount to a
conclusion that Amex was entitled to raise merchant prices
across the board for the benefit of its own cardholders.154
While the majority did not disagree with or repudiate the
district court’s detailed fact findings, it made almost no use of
them—a point that the dissenters noted. 155 Indeed, the only
way that the Court could reach its conclusions was by ignoring
the record. While the majority opinion did cite significant

149 See generally Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
150 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2282 (2018) (citing
record for proposition that Amex made some banking and payment services
available to low-income individuals).
151 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 205.
152 See infra notes 188–92 and accompanying text.
153 See Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 204 n.52.
154 On the free rider issue, see supra notes 94–96, 134–45 and
accompanying text.
155 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2293 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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academic economics literature on the issue of platforms, the
Court made very little use of it other than setting up some
basic definitions. In, fact, the Court never bothered to analyze
the particular transactions at issue and how the antisteering
rule affected consumer behavior and welfare.
By contrast, the dissent summarized the district court’s
conclusions: Under the antisteering rule, Amex was able to
increase merchant acceptance fees approximately twenty
times during a five-year period, specifically because it did not
have to worry about merchants shifting their customers to a
less costly card.156 It found that in the absence of the nosteering rule, merchant acceptance fees “would likely have
been lower.”157 It also found that the antisteering rule had
successfully deterred an attempt by Discover, a competitor, to
switch merchants by offering them lower acceptance fees.158
The district court also found that for many merchants the
costs of credit card acceptance were “among many merchants’
highest,” giving them “a strong economic incentive to take
steps to reduce” them.159 The court concluded that the
“Plaintiffs additionally are able to show harm to those same
merchants’ customers on the other side of the GPCC platform,
as inflated merchant discount rates are passed on to all
customers—AmEx cardholders and non-cardholders alike—in
the form of higher retail prices.”160
The key target of the Sherman Act’s restraint of trade
standard is reduced output and, consequently, higher
prices.161 The particular fact finding by the district court hit

Id.
Id.
158 Id. at 2293–94. On the use of vertical most-favored-nation clauses
or similar practices to deter entry, see Carlton, supra note 15.
159 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 221 (E.D.N.Y.
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
160 Id. at 208.
161 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle
Imperiled?, 44 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3197329
[https://perma.cc/EG3A-6N3C].
156
157
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that target’s bullseye. On the question of output, the record
showed everything that the Court needed to know. The
antisteering rule shifted deals to a higher cost transaction
that resulted in lost value to both the affected cardholder and
merchant. Further, it resulted in higher product prices across
the board, even to those who purchased without the use of the
Amex card.
The district court had also concluded that “the customer
neither sees nor pays the additional cost when networks
increase the price of network services to merchants (other
than in the form of higher retail prices, which are paid by all
consumers); thus, the customer cannot be expected to initiate
substitution in the first instance.”162 As Justice Breyer
described this evidence, it showed that “[c]onsumers
throughout the economy paid higher retail prices as a
result[.]”163 The district court also observed that Amex
“sharply dispute[d]” these fact findings but resolved them in
favor of the government.164 The Supreme Court did not upset
that conclusion.

F. Inattentiveness to Economic Analysis
Another point missing from the majority opinion was
analysis of how the antisteering rule affected market
participants. The Court apparently reasoned that because
transactions on the two sides of the platform balanced out,
this meant that “costs” on one side of a platform are offset by
“benefits” on the other side.165 This assumption, which is
162 Am. Express Co. 88 F. Supp. 3d at 177. The district court concluded
that “[i]n the longer term, the court expects that merchants will pass along
some amount of the savings associated with declining swipe fees to their
customers in the form of lower retail prices.” Id. at 221.
163 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2294 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164 See Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 222.
165 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288. The Second Circuit made
the same assumption. See United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179,
203 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274
(2018). Like the Supreme Court, it did not look at individual transactions
but rather made general observations about increased aggregate value to
one or the other side of the platform.
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frequently made in bird’s-eye views of networks, drove much
of the Court’s analysis. Thus in the Court’s mind it became
essential to compare burdens and benefits on the two sides in
making out a prima facie case. 166
Some cases involving two-sided platforms do involve
offsetting costs and benefits on the two sides. This is
particularly likely to be true when the only issue is source and
amount of revenue. A good example is Wallace v. IBM.167 IBM
used an open source program as the operating system for one
of its computer lines.168 As part of the open source licensing
obligations, the program had to be given away for free.169 This
is a common practice. For example, a large variety of smart
phones are sold with the Google Android operating system
included at a price of zero. IBM, of course, is not in the
business of giving away software, but of selling computers, to
which the software was distributed as a complement. Daniel
Wallace had developed a competing, proprietary operating
system that he wanted to sell to users of these computers,170
but competing with a price of zero is difficult. Wallace accused
IBM of predatory pricing.171 Judge Easterbrook dismissed the
complaint, holding mainly that the facts did not fall within
predatory pricing rules requiring a likelihood of
recoupment.172 In any event, one cannot evaluate a claim such
as predatory pricing without looking at all sources of revenue.
The price of the computer-plus-operating system was never
166 See, e.g., Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (“Amex’s higher
merchant fees are based on a careful study of how much additional value its
cardholders offer merchants. On the other side of the market, Amex uses its
higher merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more robust rewards
program, which is necessary to maintain cardholder loyalty and encourage
the level of spending that makes Amex valuable to merchants. That Amex
allocates prices between merchants and cardholders differently from Visa
and MasterCard is simply not evidence that it wields market power to
achieve anticompetitive ends.”) (citations omitted).
167 Wallace v. IBM Corp., 467 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2006).
168 Id. at 1107.
169 Id. at 1105.
170 Id. at 1106.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 1106, 1108.
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alleged to be below cost, so the court rejected the predatory
pricing claim.
Another good example arose in Meyer v. Kalanick, which
alleged that Uber was engaged in price fixing by setting a
common price among its drivers. 173 Price fixing is
anticompetitive because it is an output reducing practice that
results in higher consumer prices. But in order to determine
output effects on a two-sided platform, one must see how the
effects on one side play out on the other side, just as in
Wallace. For that purpose, it is not necessary to do anything
as irrational as define a single market for riders and drivers.
Nevertheless, one must examine the economic rationales for
Uber’s price in order to determine its effects on market output.
As the operator of a platform, Uber needs to seek out the
equilibrium spot that will bring in the optimal number of
drivers and riders. Setting fares too high discourages riders,
while setting them too low discourages drivers.174
This process does not necessarily mean that Uber’s conduct
is lawful, although it does indicate that it should not be
addressed under the per se rule for ordinary price fixing.
Indeed, the very fact that this price fixing occurs in the context
of an elaborate joint venture should be a sufficient trigger for
the rule of reason.175 Under this analysis, Uber’s conduct may
still be unlawful. For example, perhaps Uber is controlled by
a local cartel of drivers that has market power in some area.
They set prices that are too high to maximize overall profits,
but instead try to maximize the profits of the colluding
drivers.176 The complaint challenges Uber’s “peak load”
173 See Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 819–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(discussing antitrust issues in the context of a class action).
174 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text.
175 Cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–03
(1984) (stating that the rule of reason must be applied if a restraint is
essential to making the product available at all); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS,
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22–25 (1979) (rejecting claim of per se unlawful price fixing
and applying the rule of reason to conduct on a two-sided platform that the
Supreme Court described as price fixing).
176 See First Amended Complaint at ¶ 4, Meyer, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817
(No. 1:15-CV-9796), 2016 WL 950376 (alleging that Uber’s CEO conspired
with drivers to increase prices at expense of riders); but see id. ¶ 47 (noting
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pricing model that increases prices during busy periods, when
demand is large in relation to driver supply.177 But that is
precisely how one would expect an efficient two-sided platform
to work in order to maintain an equilibrium between the two
sides of the market. When rider side demand increases, a fare
increase is necessary to balance that demand with the supply
of drivers. Proof of antitrust harm would require additional
evidence, such as proof of driver control and of an entry
restriction that prevents additional drivers in such an area.
In sum, anticompetitive harm is an unlikely scenario, but one
that cannot be dismissed out of hand.
Whether or not a firm operates a platform, evaluating its
revenue requires examination of all relevant sources. For a
non-platform illustration, Coca-Cola provides free coke
machines to employers who agree to stock the machines
exclusively with Coca-Cola products.178 But that does not
necessarily mean that Coca-Cola is engaging in predatory
pricing of dispensing machines. In order to determine the
profitability of this enterprise one must look at the revenues
obtained from both the dispensing machine and the products.
Notably, one does not need to define a single relevant market
for Coca-Cola and dispensing machines in order to answer
that question.
In Amex, however, the charge was not predatory pricing or
price fixing, but rather an exclusionary practice more akin to
exclusive dealing or a most-favored-nation (MFN) clause.179
that “[f]ares are calculated based on an Uber-generated algorithm” which
increases fares as demand increases in relation to supply (surge pricing)).
Similar peak load pricing is common in intermediate sales of electric power,
which also occurs on a two-sided platform between generators and users.
See, e.g., RAFAL WERON, MODELING AND FORECASTING ELECTRICITY LOADS
AND PRICES: A STATISTICAL APPROACH 4–5 (2006).
177 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 176, at ¶¶ 2, 4, 47.
178 Coke
Vending
Machine,
VENDINGSOLUTIONS,
http://www.vendingsolutions.com/coke-vending-machines
[https://perma.cc/MVR6-4EJP]; see also Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 925,
942, 943 n.78 (2010).
179 On antisteering rules as most-favored-nation clauses, see Carlton,
supra note 15; see also Carlton & Winter, supra note 17, at 215–16.
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Not only did the Court pay scant attention to the record, but
it also never analyzed the transaction to determine how the
harms and benefits balance out on the two sides. As Ronald
Coase taught, when one wants to understand a practice, there
is no good substitute for examining the incentives to make
each individual transaction, small as they might be, and
considering how they affect the whole. 180 However, neither
the Second Circuit nor the Supreme Court did this.

G. Marginal Harms and Benefits
Competition always exists at the margin. It requires firms
to make incremental changes to their business methods,
continuously tracking and adjusting to reflect their successes
or failures. These changes may or may not be anticompetitive,
quite apart from the overall structure of the firm or
organization that implements them. To the extent that a
chosen rule or decision might harm competition, the rule of
reason is designed to manage this process. For example, in
Amex the government was not trying to tear down Amex’s
entire business model, but only to enjoin its antisteering rule.
Such a case requires an assessment of the marginal costs and
benefits of the antisteering rule itself. One pervasive error in
the Supreme Court majority’s analysis was that it failed to
distinguish the challenged rule’s marginal effects from the
overall impact of the defendant’s business model. It simply
assumed that harms on one side were offset by benefits on the
other, or else it spoke of evidence about the defendant’s overall
business model. The record was clear, however, that at the
margin each merchant affected by the steering rule was worse
off, and each cardholder was worse off as well. Competitive
harm was clear.
One cannot evaluate the competitive effects of a particular
restraint by considering whether the overall costs of a
defendant’s business practices exceed the benefits. For
example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of
Oklahoma, the challenge was not to the existence or
180

(1937).

See R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 397–98
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legitimacy of the NCAA as an association; rather it was to the
effect of a limitation on the televising of games.181 The issue
was whether the incremental harm to competition caused by
the challenged restriction on the number of televised games
was justified by offsetting incremental benefits.182 By the
same token, the question in Amex was not whether Amex’s
general business model of charging higher merchant fees for
large perks produced overall benefits. Rather it was whether
the incremental harm caused by the antisteering rule
produced incremental competitive harms greater than
incremental benefits. That would require an assessment of the
competitive effects of that particular rule.
The Second Circuit also confused total and marginal effects
by stating that “because the NDPs183 affect competition for
cardholders as well as merchants, the Plaintiffs initial burden
was to show that the NDPs made all Amex consumers on both
sides of the platform—i.e., both merchants and cardholders—
worse off overall.”184
But that was not the question. As with any restraint, many
customers were not affected at all. For example, the restraint
on game televising in NCAA did not affect those who did not
watch televised games at all. 185 Similarly, rules imposing
resale price maintenance affect only discounters who would
otherwise charge a lower price.186 Standard setting and other
boycott rules affect only producers at risk of violating a

181 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984); see
also 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 1502–03, 1511.
182 See id. at 94.
183 The Second Circuit used the term “nondiscrimination provisions,”
or NDPs to describe Amex’s policies “barring merchants from (1) offering
customers any discounts or nonmonetary incentives to use credit cards less
costly for merchants to accept, (2) expressing preferences for any card, or (3)
disclosing information about the costs of different cards to merchants who
accept them. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir.
2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
184 Id. at 205.
185 See NCAA, 468 U.S. 85.
186 See 8 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 139, at ¶¶ 1624d, 1625,
1627.
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standard.187 One might continue with such illustrations. But
it should be clear that when the government was seeking only
an injunction against the rule rather than complete
destruction of the defendant’s business method, then it is the
effect of that particular rule that must be examined. Here,
those customers affected by the antisteering rule were those
that would have switched to a less costly card but for the rule.
By implication, the value they placed on the defendant’s perks
was less than the incremental price to merchants of using the
Amex card.
Consider the following example, which can readily be
generalized.188 On a typical transaction, the Amex merchant
acceptance fee may be fifty percent greater than the fee
charged by competing cards. Suppose that on a particular
purchase Amex’s merchant fee was $30, but $20 for Visa. This
$10 difference creates bargaining room—a “surplus,” in
Coasean terms189—for the merchant and the cardholder to
strike a mutually beneficial deal. Suppose that the merchant
offers the customer a $6 discount for using a Visa card instead,
which would make the customer $6 better off for that
particular transaction and the merchant $4 better off. The
customer would agree if the value it placed on Amex’s perks
was less than the $6 price discount.
The antisteering provision prevents this transaction from
occurring, however. As a result, the customer stays with the
Amex card and experiences a $6 loss. The merchant loses $4
as well. So, far from being a situation where value goes up on
one side and down on the other, it actually goes down on both
sides. At the margin, both the cardholder side and the
merchant side of the platform are losers. In addition, the
competing platform, Visa, is also worse off because it was
denied the opportunity to offer a lower cost substitute
transaction. The only entity that is better off is Amex—the
owner of the platform itself, but not the dealing parties on one
See 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 2231 (3d ed. 2012).
The analysis here relies on Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 27.
189 See, e.g., Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(1982) (discussing R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1960)).
187
188
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or the other side of the platform. It is better off because the
Amex cardholder who would have switched did not place much
value on the Amex perks, suggesting that margins on those
sales would have been particularly high. The Amex
cardholders most likely to switch are those that would benefit
most from using a different card.
As the district court observed, other Amex cardholders
would decline the merchant’s offer to switch, because for them
the value of the perks might be as high as the merchant’s
acceptance fee, or at least as high as that portion of the fee
that the merchant offered them for switching.190 Cardholders
whose behavior was actually changed by the antisteering rule
were worse off as a result of the rule, thus creating lost value
on both sides of the platform.191 That is why, even if the
market were irrationally defined as including both sides, the
way the majority defined it, 192 competitive harm was
apparent: at the margin, cardholders, merchants, and rival
platforms were all injured by an output-reducing restraint.
Whom does the antisteering rule benefit in this case? Not
the traders on either side of the platform, but only Amex itself,
who is able to retain that transaction at margins in excess of
190 United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 220 (E.D.N.Y.
2015), rev’d, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (“[E]ven if a merchant is inclined to steer away
from American Express, the cardholder would still have the freedom to use
an Amex card if the cardholder decides the rewards offered by American
Express are of greater value than the discount, in-kind perk, or other benefit
offered by the merchant.”).
191 The Second Circuit stated the requirement as whether the
antisteering rule “made all Amex consumers on both sides of the platform—
i.e., both merchants and cardholders—worse off over all.” United States v.
Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 205 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d sub nom. Ohio v.
Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). The phrase “over all” is ambiguous,
but it may imply the proper question, and the one that the government
actually answered, which is that it made every affected merchant and
cardholder worse off. For example, in an exclusive dealing case courts do
not ask if every customer would have switched but for exclusive dealing,
thus giving the defendant a market share of zero. Instead, the question is
whether enough would have switched to create an inference of competitive
harm.
192 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
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the value that these cardholders placed on use of the card.
Amex benefits because its volume increases by that one
transaction, but Visa loses that same transaction.193 One
might be tempted to describe that shift as a wash, but in fact
it is not. The shift to Visa, the preferred platform for both the
cardholder and the merchant, would produce both higher
cardholder and merchant value as well as higher output in the
product market. To be sure, the loss of these transactions
would cost Amex revenue and there would be feedback effects
that would generate a new, and likely less profitable
equilibrium for Amex, but that is what competition is all
about.
This is the point at which a possible defense would come
in. One factor worth examining is whether preserving the
transaction to Amex was necessary to the viability of its
business model. And if so, does that provide a benefit to
competition in excess of costs? For example, Amex might
argue that it needs a certain minimum transaction volume
coupled with higher prices in order to be profitable. First of
all, this query does not depend on whether there is one market
or two.194 Indeed, it does not even depend on the existence of
a platform, but only on the existence of scale economies or
other attributes relating profitability to scale. These are core
issues in industrial organization. Second, the need to
maintain viability while charging higher prices hardly sounds
like a meritorious antitrust defense.
Steering would permit the bargaining parties—i.e.,
merchants and customers—to negotiate to the joint
maximizing position. Consumers who place a small value on
Amex’s perks could use a different form of payment and would
be better off. For their part, merchants could bargain by
discounting the price, or offering collateral services such as
free delivery, to reflect the merchant costs of a particular
payment form. The important thing is that in the absence of
transaction costs and under good information, everything

193
194

See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 30–31.
See id. at 25–27.
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would get discounted into the purchase price.195 This becomes
an important efficiency principle: payment systems should be
“neutral” and transparent, permitting the parties to negotiate
to a mutually beneficial maximum.196 The Amex antisteering
rule was a bargaining impediment that prevented the
payment platform’s own participants from reaching a jointmaximizing deal. Moreover, in the process of injuring its own
participants, it also excluded rival card platforms who were
ready, willing, and able to offer better terms. Consequently, it
resulted in higher product prices across the board.
Looking at the situation as a whole, it seems clear that the
district court and Justice Breyer got the issue right through a
careful examination of the record. Stated in rule of reason
terms, the question was whether the plaintiff had presented
enough evidence of competitive harm to require the defendant
to offer a defense. The harms were clear: cardholders were
denied an opportunity to obtain a lower price, the merchants
were denied the opportunity for a less costly transaction, and
rival cards that were less costly lost sales. From a consumer
welfare perspective, the directly affected consumers were
worse off, as well as other consumers who were forced to pay
higher product prices regardless of the form of payment they

195

See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–16

(1960).
196 See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 15, at 648 (“Neutrality in payment
systems. The choice of an interchange fee paid by the merchant’s bank, the
acquirer, to the cardholder’s bank, the issuer, is irrelevant if the following
conditions are jointly satisfied: First, issuers and acquirers pass through the
corresponding charge (or benefit) to the cardholder and the merchant.
Second, the merchant can charge two different prices for goods or services
depending on whether the consumer pays by cash or by card; in other words,
the payment system does not impose a no-surcharge rule as a condition for
the merchant to be affiliated with the system. Third, the merchant and the
consumer incur no transaction cost associated with a dual-price system.”).
As Rochet and Tirole observe, the Coase Theorem indicates that in a wellfunctioning market, merchants and customers would move to a wealth
maximizing equilibrium. Id. at 649. But the minimum conditions are that
the parties are free to bargain (i.e., no prohibition on steering) and that they
have adequate information about the gains that would be available from
trading. See id.
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chose.197 While Amex itself was benefitted by preserving the
transaction to its own system, this was at best a wealth
transfer from whatever platform lost the transaction.198 In
fact, the antisteering rule was not a neutral wealth transfer
at all, but rather a transfer from a competing platform that
generated higher value to one that generated lower value. As
Justice Breyer noted in dissent, looking at the prima facie
case, “there is little more that need be said.”199

H. Implications for Market Definition
Amex raises important issues concerning market definition
in antitrust cases. As discussed above, grouping both sides of
a platform into a single relevant market was economic
nonsense and, in any event, unnecessary to the analysis that
the Court undertook.200 Nevertheless, the law is what it is
and, that leaves important questions about the scope of the
decision’s holding.
The Court held that not every two-sided platform qualified
for its unique approach, but noted that transactional
platforms in which there is a simultaneous one-to-one
correspondence between the transactions on one side of the
platform and those on the other side are “different.”201 Even
this definition was too broad to be supported by some of the
literature the majority cited. 202 Further, it was apparently
See supra notes 180–92 and accompanying text.
See Hovenkamp, supra note 15, at 30.
199 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2294 (2018) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
200 See supra notes 101–12 and accompanying text.
201 See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (requiring “a single,
simultaneous transaction between participants”).
202 As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, see id. at 2300, the Court’s
definition was broader than the definition given even in the economic
literature that the majority opinion cited. For example, Rochet & Tirole,
whom the majority relies on, say this:
197
198

“Getting the two sides on board” is a useful characterization,
but it is not restrictive enough. Indeed, if the analysis just
stopped there, pretty much any market would be two-sided,
since buyers and sellers need to be brought together for

82

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2019

driven by the Court’s mistaken view that in a transactional
platform each gain on one side generates an equal-andoffsetting benefit on the other side. 203
Nevertheless, under the majority’s approach the two sides
of the Amex platform constitute a single relevant market
because a $50 transaction on the consumer side of the Amex
platform is simultaneously offset by a $50 transaction on the
merchant side, less Amex’s acceptance fee.
Upon first glance, Uber would appear to be another
instance of a pure transaction platform under this approach.
Each ride that a passenger purchases generates a
corresponding and simultaneous payment to the driver, less
the fee. Interbank ATM platforms are very likely in the same
category. The same may also be true of airline and hotel
reservation websites, such as Orbitz and Expedia, and
perhaps of venue websites such as Ticketmaster.204 All of
these cases, however, will depend on a careful evaluation of
the facts.
The Court also observed that other types of platforms
exhibit a looser relationship between transactions on one side
and those on the other, and these would not fall within the
Court’s “single market” rule. It noted sales of newspapers and
markets to exist and gains from trade to be realized. We
define a two-sided market as one in which the volume of
transactions between end-users depends on the structure
and not only on the overall level of the fees charged by the
platform. A platform’s usage or variable charges impact the
two sides’ willingness to trade once on the platform and,
thereby, their net surpluses from potential interactions; the
platforms’ membership or fixed charges in turn condition
the end-users’ presence on the platform. The platforms’ fine
design of the structure of variable and fixed charges is
relevant only if the two sides do not negotiate away the
corresponding usage and membership externalities.
Rochet & Tirole, supra note 15, at 646.
203 See supra notes 188–93 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., Brief of US Airways at 2, US Airways, Inc. v. Sabre
Holdings Corp., No. 17-960(L) & 17-983(XAP), 2018 WL 3456163, (2d Cir.
July 16, 2018) (considering whether airline Global Distribution System
(GDS) for travel agents, which facilitates ticket transactions, is a qualifying
single market under Amex).
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advertising, where the relationship is more attenuated.205
That would also be the case for most magazines. It is also true
of computer search engines, advertiser-supported music
streaming, and other advertiser-supported services. For
these, there is no balanced one-to-one transaction between the
two sides. Other pay websites that do not exhibit one-to-one
relationships include services such as Netflix, Amazon Prime
Video, and Hulu. For these, subscribers typically pay a
regular monthly fee after which the incremental cost of
content is free. Therefore, there is neither simultaneity nor a
very close correspondence between the size of the fee and the
volume of content that the viewer can access.206 For example,
a Netflix subscriber pays $8.99 a month for a basic
subscription whether she watches one movie during that time
period or a dozen.207 Amazon Prime Video is a little more
complex because it concurrently offers “Prime” movies at an
incremental price of zero and also pay movies, for which
Amazon collects an individual fee, say $3.99, from
customers.208
There is an additional problem with movie and music
streaming, however, which is that the platform operator itself
is often the seller or licensor. Both Netflix and Amazon, as
well as the music streamers, typically obtain nonexclusive
licenses to the content that they stream, often in fixed-cost
license agreements.209 As a result, they are not acting as a
See Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286.
For example, all Netflix plans offer unlimited viewing of Netflix
content for a single monthly fee. See Choose Your Plan, NETFLIX,
https://www.netflix.com/signup/planform (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review).
207 See
Choose a Plan That’s Right for You, NETFLIX,
https://www.netflix.com/signup/planform (on file with the Columbia
Business Law Review).
208 See Andy Beatman, What Is Prime Video? – Amazon Prime Insider,
AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/primeinsider/video/prime-video-qa.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5B9-LYDF] (describing both “Prime” content and rental
content).
209 See Erik Hovenkamp & Neel U. Sukhatme, Vertical Mergers and
the MFN Thicket in Television, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Aug. 2018, at 4,
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads
205
206
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platform intermediary between the movie’s owner and the
customer. Having acquired a nonexclusive license at a fixed
fee that permits relicensing, Netflix or Amazon are
themselves the sellers, so there are not two sides of the market
to define but only a seller on one side and a buyer on the other
side, as with any market. This is a critical distinction. The
premise in a case such as Amex is that the merchant is selling
its own product and the customer is buying it. Amex is only
the platform intermediary facilitating the transaction. The
merchant does not sell the product to Amex, who then in turn
sells it to the customer. The same is true of Uber: Drivers do
not sell rides to Uber, which in turn sells them to passengers.
The Amex majority’s approach does not apply when the
merchandise is actually sold or licensed to the operator of the
platform.
By the same token, to the extent that Amazon, Walmart,
Target, or numerous other retailers purchase goods from
manufacturers and then sell them on their websites, the
platform operator is not merely a transaction facilitator.
Therefore, the established economics of market definition
should apply in those cases. If websites such as Orbitz and
Expedia purchase blocks of rooms for resale, or if
Ticketmaster purchases a block of tickets for a particular
performance, those transactions do not qualify for Amex’s
market definition approach either. Likewise, in a blanket
license case such as BMI, the artist provides BMI with a nonexclusive license and subsequently BMI sells a blanket license
to a radio station.210 There is neither simultaneity nor a oneto-one transactional correspondence.
The status of app stores on smartphones may become
relevant in consideration of Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, which the

/2018/08/CPI-Hovenkamp-Sukhatme.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SBK-RTH7].
Under fixed-cost license agreements the licensee, such as Netflix, pays a
one-time fee for a nonexclusive license to a film for a given time period, but
does not pay a per use fee. See id.
210 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979); see also
supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court will soon address.211 The issue is whether
customers who purchase apps for their iPhones or other Apple
devices through Apple’s App Store, are direct purchasers from
Apple. Assuming that the app producers are the violators, the
underlying legal question is whether the app platform is a
mere broker between the app producer and the consumer, or
a purchaser-reseller. If the latter, the indirect purchaser rule
barring damages actions to indirect purchasers applies. 212 A
question pertinent to Amex that is not necessarily governed
by Illinois Brick is whether the transactions were
“simultaneous,” as Amex requires. For instance, the app
producer may have licensed and delivered its app to Apple in
advance, which held them in its own cloud or storage devices,
delivering them to a customer upon order. Under that
scenario, the developer sold (licensed) the app to Apple, which
held it until a later time when a customer bought (licensed) a
copy.213 One important principle is that Amex does not provide
a basis for turning ordinary vertical distribution into a single
market at both the upstream and downstream levels. Many of
the economic effects commonly attributed to platforms are
similar to those that result from ordinary vertical
distribution.214
There are also intermediate platforms where the relation
between transactions on one side of the platform and those on
the other side is not one-to-one and, in most cases, not
simultaneous either. A prominent example is health
211 See In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313 (9th Cir. 2017),
cert. granted sub. nom. Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 138 S. Ct. 2647 (2018); see also
Salveson v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 663 F. App’x 71 (2d Cir. 2016); In re
Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., 05-MD1720, 2018 WL 4158290, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018) (noting possible
relevance of Amex to decision considering whether credit cardholders were
indirect purchasers from issuing banks).
212 See Ill. Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730–31 (1977); see also 2A
PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ROGER D. BLAIR & CHRISTINE
PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 346 (4th ed. 2014).
213 Apple’s position on the issue is articulated in a brief to the Supreme
Court. See Brief of Petitioner at 2–3, In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litig., 138
S. Ct. 2647 (No. 17-204).
214 On this point, see Carlton & Winter, supra note 17, at 215.
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insurance networks. On one side is the insured patient, who
receives a covered medical procedure. On the other side is a
health care provider. In the middle is the platform, which is
an insurer who collects premiums from the insured or her
employer and pays the provider’s claim.215 Here, however, the
sales to insured are neither simultaneous nor are they made
on a matching fee-for-service basis.
Actually, the arrangement that the Supreme Court
condemned under the per se rule in its Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Society216 decision looks a little more like a
two-sided platform as the Amex opinion defined it. In that
case, physician participants agreed to be compensated at
stipulated fees per service, which were paid by the insured or,
more likely, an employer.217 Even this arrangement would not
meet the Amex definition unless payment and receipt were
simultaneous. In any event, since Maricopa condemned such
arrangements, insurers have taken a more actuarial approach
that requires providers to share a certain amount of risk.218
The Maricopa decision itself contemplated that result,
suggesting that firms that “pool their capital and share the
risks of loss as well as the opportunities for profit” be treated
more like an integrated single entity.219
In the modern health insurance network, characterized by
risk sharing and actuarial pricing, it clearly is not the case
that the platform “facilitate[s] a single, simultaneous
215 One decision that discussed the then-pending Amex decision
involved a horizontal territorial division and price-fixing agreement among
Blue Cross affiliates is In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 308 F.
Supp. 3d 1241, 1276 n.20 (N.D. Ala. 2018); see also Lifewatch Servs. Inc. v.
Highmark Inc., 902 F.3d 323, 337 (3d Cir. 2018), which mentioned the
possible relevance of Amex to a market definition question in a health
insurance market, but did not decide the case on that basis.
216 See Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
217 Id. at 339–40.
218 See Scott D. Danzis, Revising the Revised Guidelines: Incentives,
Clinically Integrated Physician Networks, and the Antitrust Laws, 87 VA. L.
REV. 531, 531–44 (2001); Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition,
Integrated Delivery Systems and Antitrust, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1530
(1994).
219 Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 356.
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transaction between participants[,]” as the Supreme Court
required.220 The insurer might receive a premium of, say,
$500 per month from the insured and pay the insured’s
medical expenses for that month, less any deductibles, copays,
and the like. The insurer’s payment could be greater or
smaller than $500 depending on the insured’s needs. To be
sure, there is often a co-payment, such as a flat fee per office
visit. However, this co-payment is often not made to the
insurer at all, but rather directly to the health care provider.
In that case the network is not acting as an intermediary.
Once again, there is no substitute for careful examination of a
record.
Suppose that an insurer network enters an exclusive
agreement with a provider, effectively denying that provider
the ability to service other networks or health payment
systems. Ordinary exclusive dealing principles might require
foreclosure on the order of, say, thirty percent for a prima facie
case.221 This might require that both a provider market and a
consumer market be defined, but it would not require
anything as economically incoherent as putting them into the
same market.222 In response, the defense might be raised that
the network provider needs exclusive dealing with, say,
anesthesiologists in order to make its network economically
viable, but that is a question that can largely be answered
independently of network considerations.
Other platforms not included in Amex’s “single market”
definition include intermediaries that bring buyers and
sellers together but have little to do with the resulting
transaction. For example, real estate websites such as
realtor.com and Zillow.com identify real properties that are
for sale or rent. Having settled on a property, a prospective
purchaser then contacts the broker by email or telephone and,
after subsequent negotiations, there may be a sale. But none
of this comes close to the kind of simultaneous one-to-one

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2286 (2018).
See 11 HOVENKAMP, supra note 117 ¶ 1821c (discussing foreclosure
percentages and suggesting a minimum in the range of thirty percent).
222 See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
220
221
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transaction that was present in Amex. The same thing is
largely true of dating websites such as Match.com or
OkCupid.com. Typically, members on both sides pay a
monthly or annual fee, although some sites also offer free
versions. As in the case of real estate sites, however, the
website does little more than introduce two people to each
other. What, if anything, happens later occurs largely off the
site. At first glance, Craigslist appears to resemble these sites
more than, say, eBay, which actually completes transactions
on the site. On Craigslist, offerors of merchandise or services
essentially post an advertisement with contact information,
but prospective purchasers typically make their contact and
any subsequent transaction off the site.
The same thing appears to be true of the NCAA, which may
be a multi-sided platform that, according to one expert, brings
together students, student athletes, alumni, coaches and
athletic staff.223 Factually, this may be true, but that will not
satisfy the definition of a single two-sided relevant market for
antitrust purposes unless someone can show the requisite
simultaneous one-to-one transaction between both sides.
There are certainly other examples, but the important
point is that only a relatively small subset of two-sided
platforms fall within the Court’s requirements for treating the
two sides as a single market. On this question, maintaining a
coherent economic approach to antitrust policy requires that
Amex be limited to its facts. In any event, the Supreme Court
was clear that the two sides should not be treated as a single
market unless they were characterized by “transactions” that
were both “simultaneous” and one-to-one.224

IV. CONCLUSION
One danger of the Amex decision is its signal that neither
close economic analysis nor careful examination of the record
is necessary to apply antitrust law under the rule of reason.
That, of course, flies in the face of a century-long history of
223 See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14md-02541 CW, 2018 WL 4241981, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 3, 2018).
224 Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. at 2286.
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rule of reason analysis in the federal courts, which has always
emphasized careful examination of a well-developed record on
issues pertaining to both power and conduct. 225 Judge William
Howard Taft himself distinguished ancillary from naked
restraints only by careful examination of the facts.226
The Amex majority never concluded that the district court’s
fact findings were an abuse of discretion or otherwise
improper. Rather, it simply ignored them. Nor did it declare
as a matter of law that close examination of a factual record
is unimportant in antitrust cases under the rule of reason. As
a result, the lower federal courts should not feel precluded
from engaging in the kind of close transactional analysis that
the rule of reason traditionally requires if decisions are to be
economically coherent.
The economic literature on two-sided platforms has made
major contributions to price and industrial organization
theory in a wide variety of markets. It deserves an important
position in both industrial economics and competition policy.
At the same time, however, its influence should not be
exaggerated. It is, essentially, a tool of neoclassical economics,
not a discovery that realistically threatens to alter the
foundations of economics.
The two-sided-platform literature is strongly reminiscent
of another development in the theory of industrial
organization thirty years ago. That theory, termed
“contestable markets,” grew out of the imminently reasonable
observation that where a market contains only one seller,
competition “for the market” can yield competitive outcomes
just as much as competition by multiple incumbents “in the
market.”227 The theory of contestable markets was introduced

See Hovenkamp, supra note 99, at 101–02.
See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280–83
(6th Cir. 1898), modified and aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
227 On the initial debate, see generally Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate
Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) and Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise
Bidding for Natural Monopolies—In General and With Respect to CATV, 7
BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976). For a reprise, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation
and the Marginalist Revolution, FLA. L. REV (forthcoming 2019),
225
226
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by prominent economists with great fanfare, producing a
spate of articles and at least one important book. 228 The late
William J. Baumol, a past president of the American
Economic Association, proclaimed it to be an “uprising” in the
theory of industry structure.229 It promised to eliminate the
need for such things as public utility or airline regulation
because even a natural monopolist incumbent knew that the
instant it attempted to charge too high a price a potential rival
would swoop in and steal the business.
But the theory never lived up to anything remotely
resembling its expectations, although it did provide some
valuable lessons. Even in the airline industry, thought to be a
prime target for contestability, competition among incumbent
carriers remains an important determinant of price and
output. The theory of platform markets will pursue much the
same course. After a brief period of exaggeration, industrial
organization theory will be enriched, but will remain
fundamentally the same. The Amex majority opinion serves to
highlight what happens when a Court abandons fundamental
economics in its haste to encounter something new.
The decision that seems to come closest to Amex as an
economic “misfire” is the Supreme Court’s 1992 ruling in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, in which the
Court held that sufficient power to condemn a tie of parts and
service by a nondominant firm could be inferred from
consumer “lock in.”230 Kodak was a six to three decision, but
the reaction to Kodak was so strongly critical that subsequent
lower court decisions went to great lengths to limit it.231 It has
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228 See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. P ANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG ,
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1988).
229 William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory
of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1982).
230 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 496
(1992).
231 On the case law limiting Kodak, see 10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1740 (4th ed. 2018) (discussing
tying arrangements and the Kodak decision).
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had little impact on antitrust outcomes even though lock-in is
more prevalent today in our modern networked world than it
was in 1992.
Other consequences could be on the horizon. This decision
will encourage more legislation and regulation as more
decision makers lose confidence in judge-made antitrust rules
to promote competition. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent,
several jurisdictions around the world have acted against high
interchange fees and antisteering rules, mostly by statute or
agency rule.232 The United States legal system has
historically relied less on regulation and more on antitrust
law, which can be much less intrusive. But what this decision
describes as “steering” is actually among the most ordinary
and essential of competitive functions: encouraging people to
acquire information and giving them the option to choose.
This process protects the competitive process, both improving
product quality and driving prices to the competitive level. For
example, a common concern about healthcare costs is that
they are so high because patients are indifferent to prices.
First, medical bills are paid indirectly by insurers. Second,
most patients do not even pay the insurance premium; rather,
it is paid by either an employer or a government agency. As a
result, the patient bears only a small portion of the cost and is
inclined to spend too much. The antisteering rule operates in
much the same way: it makes the cardholder indifferent to
merchant costs and thus diminishes the consumer incentive
to reduce them.
Today, the consumer welfare principle in antitrust is under
attack from people who argue for abandonment of economic
approaches to antitrust in favor of populism, political theory,
or some other source.233 Decisions like Amex add fuel to their
232 See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-558, CREDIT
AND DEBIT CARDS: FEDERAL ENTITIES ARE TAKING ACTIONS TO LIMIT THEIR
INTERCHANGE FEES, BUT ADDITIONAL REVENUE COLLECTION COST SAVINGS
MAY EXIST 31–35 (2008)).
233 See generally Barak Orbach, Antitrust Populism, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. &
BUS. 1 (2017); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 714 (2018); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 161, at 1–4.
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cause. The success of antitrust as an enterprise driven by
economic policy depends on the ability and willingness of
judges to use economics effectively, bringing monopoly prices
and output restrictions under control while protecting
provable efficiencies. The rule of reason cannot be simply an
excuse for judges to ignore well developed records and sound
economic theory in order to reach a conclusion that they find
pleasing on noneconomic grounds.

